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Abstract 
To meet the Basel II regulatory requirements for the Advanced Measurement Approaches 
in operational risk, the bank’s internal model should make use of the internal data, relevant 
external data, scenario analysis and factors reflecting the business environment and internal 
control systems. One of the unresolved challenges in operational risk is combining of these 
data sources appropriately. In this paper we focus on quantification of the low frequency 
high impact losses exceeding some high threshold. We suggest a full credibility theory 
approach to estimate frequency and severity distributions of these losses by taking into 
account bank internal data, expert opinions and industry data.  
 
 
Keywords: quantitative risk management, operational risk, loss distribution approach, 
credibility theory, combining different data sources, Basel II Advanced Measurement 
Approaches. 
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1 Introduction 
Under the Basel II requirements, BIS (2005), a bank intending to use the Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (AMA) for quantification of operational risk losses should 
demonstrate the accuracy of the internal model within Basel II risk cells relevant to the 
bank. The industry usually refers these risk cells as “risk nodes” in the regulatory matrix of 
eight business lines times seven risk types. To meet regulatory requirements, the model 
should make use of the internal data, relevant external data, scenario analysis and factors 
reflecting business environment and internal control systems. There are various aspects of 
operational risk modelling, see for example Chavez-Demoulin, Embrechts and Nešlehová 
(2006), Cruz (2004). Under the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) of AMA, the banks 
quantify distributions for the frequency and severity of operational losses for each risk cell 
over a one year time horizon. The banks can use their own risk cell structure but must be 
able to map the losses to the Basel II risk cells. The commonly used LDA model for an 
annual loss Z  in a risk cell is a compound process 
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where N  is the annual number of events modelled as a random variable from some 
discrete distribution )|(. θP  and NkX k ,...,1, = , are the severities of the events modelled 
as independent random variables from a continuous distribution )|(. ξF . Here, θ  and ξ  are 
distribution parameters (risk profile latent variables). The frequency N  and the severities 
NkX k ,...,1, = , are assumed conditionally (given θ  and ξ ) independent. In our approach 
θ  and ξ  are modelled as realizations of random variables drawn from some distribution. 
We will consider a group of risks where θ  and ξ  are different for the different risks but are 
drawn from distribution common across the risks. In the proposed framework we do not 
consider risks individually but regard each risk as embedded in a group of “similar” risks. 
Constructing such risk groups is important in practice but will not be discussed here.  
In this paper we focus on quantification of the low frequency high impact losses 
exceeding some high threshold for a risk cell (often, most of the operational risk capital is 
due to these losses). Estimation of the frequency and severity distributions of such losses 
for each risk cell is a challenging task. The bank’s internal data are typically collected over 
several years and contain few low frequency high impact losses. The industry data are 
available through external databases from vendors (e.g. OpVar® Database) and consortia 
of banks (e.g. ORX). Typically, vendors provide data for losses above US$1million while 
consortium-based data collection threshold is of the order of US$10,000. These are difficult 
to use directly due to different volumes and other factors. Moreover, the data, probably, 
have a survival bias. Scenario analysis is undertaken by banks to obtain some quantitative 
assessment of the risk frequency and severity distributions using expert opinions, see for 
example Alderweireld, Garcia and Léonard (2006). By itself, scenario analysis is very 
subjective and should be combined with the analysis of the actual loss data. Combining of 
internal data with external data and expert opinions in appropriate way is one of the 
unresolved challenges in operational risk. In practice, ad-hoc procedures are often used to 
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combine these data sources for estimation of the frequency and severity distributions in a 
risk cell. For example: a) the severity distribution is fitted to the combined samples of 
internal and external data; b) estimated event arrival rates extλ  and intλ  (implied by 
external and internal data) are combined as extww λλ )1(int −+  using expert specified (or 
ad-hoc calculated) weight w  to estimate frequency distribution; c) the severity distributions 
)(XFSA , )(int XF  and )(XFext  are fitted (using scenario analysis, internal and external data 
respectively) and then combined as )()1()()( 21int21 XFwwXFwXFw extSA −−++  with 
some ad-hoc weights 1w , 2w  to estimate the overall severity distribution. Often frequency 
distribution is estimated using internal data only, while the severity is modelled by both 
internal and external data. 
In this paper, we suggest a full credibility theory approach (successfully used in the 
insurance industry and actuarial sciences for many decades) to estimate frequency and 
severity distributions of the low frequency large losses in each risk cell by taking into 
account bank internal data, expert opinions and industry data. We present a model, where 
the Pareto and Poisson distributions are used for modelling severity and frequency 
respectively. Our approach to estimate the parameter of the Pareto distribution goes back to 
Rytgaard (1990). Although, the model might be simple it may be very useful at this stage 
when the data are very limited and it may also have educational impact. Also, it gives a 
simple example of a consistent credibility approach for estimating operational risk. The 
external data are incorporated into the model via the hierarchical credibility method 
described in Bühlmann and Gisler (2005), Chapter 6. The credibility estimators for the 
severity and frequency distribution parameters, presented in this paper, are based on the use 
of the Bühlmann-Straub model, developed in 1970 (see Bühlmann and Gisler (2005), 
Theorem 4.4). 
 
Bühlmann-Straub model. Consider a portfolio of J risks modelled by random variables 
jkj KkY ,...,1:, = , Jj ,...,1=  and denote ),...,( ,1, jKjjj YY=Y . Note that, jK  may vary 
between the risks. Assume that, for known weights kjw , , the j-th risk is characterized by an 
individual risk profile jθ , which is itself the realization of a random variable jΘ , and  
a) for all j, the jkj KkY ,...,1:, =  are conditionally (given jΘ ) independent with  
)(]|[ , jjkjYE Θ=Θ μ , kjjjkj wY ,2, /)(]|[Var Θ=Θ σ  ;                     (2) 
b) the pairs ),( 11 YΘ , …, ),( JJ YΘ  are independent;  
c) 1Θ ,…, JΘ  are independent and identically distributed. 
Define )]([0 jE Θ= μμ , )]([ 22 jE Θ= σσ  and )]([Var2 jΘ= μτ , Jj ,...,1= . Then the 
homogeneous credibility estimator of )( jΘμ  is given by  
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Hereafter, “hat” is used to denote the estimator of the true value, e.g. 0μˆ  is the estimator of 
0μ . The credibility estimators are linear in the observations. They minimize mean square 
errors of predictions among all linear combinations of the observations. Usually, the 
credibility estimators are used to estimate expected number of events or expected loss. 
However, in general, given that the assumptions of the Bühlmann-Straub model are valid, 
they can be applied to estimate any square integrable valued random variable Z based on 
some known random vector Y . For example, the elements of Y  can be the maximum 
likelihood estimators (as in this paper), transformed data, quantiles, etc. 
 
 
Figure 1. Main variables and blocks of the “Toy” model for operational risk. )1( ,kjX  are losses (above 
threshold )1(jL ) in risk cells Jj ,...,1=  of Bank 1. The loss frequency and severity are modelled by the 
Poisson and Pareto distributions respectively with parameters )1()1()1( jjj λνθ =  and )1()1()1( jjj a ϑξ =  
correspondingly. The distribution parameters )1(jλ  and )1(jϑ  are drawn from common (bank specific) 
distributions with )1(0
)1( ][ λλ =jE , 2)1(0)1( )(][Var ωλ =j  and )1(0)1( ][ ϑϑ =jE , 2)1(0)1( )(][Var τϑ =j  respectively. 
Scaling factors )1(ja  and 
)1(
jν  for the relative differences between the risks can be specified using expert 
opinions. The structural parameters )(0
mλ  and )(0mϑ  of the banks Mm ,...,1=  are drawn from common 
(industry specific) distributions with coll
mE λλ =][ )(0 , 2)(0 ][Var collm ωλ =  and collmE ϑϑ =][ )(0 , 
2)(
0 ][Var coll
m τϑ =  correspondingly. 
1
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,1 ,...,1, KkX k =  
)1()1( , JJ λϑ  )1(2)1(2 , λϑ  
)1(
1
)1(
1 , λϑ  
Industry (external data) 
collϑ , collλ  
Bank 1 
)1(
0ϑ , )1(0λ  
Risk cells (...)
Other banks 
)(
0
mϑ , )(0mλ , Mm ,...,2=  
Jja jj ,...,1,,
)1()1( =ν  
(expert opinions) 
JkJ KkX ,...,1,
)1(
, =  
(...) (...)
Internal loss data 
Risk cells 
 6
2 Modelling severity 
Consider Bank 1, see Figure 1 (the upper index in all variables is used to refer the bank), 
and suppose that losses above threshold )1(jL  in the j-th risk cell (
)1(,...,1 Jj = ) are Pareto 
distributed with the density and distribution functions given by 
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for )1(jLx ≥ , 0)1( >jξ . It is assumed that )1(jL  are known. This distribution is often used in 
the insurance industry to model large claims and is a good candidate for modelling large 
operational risk losses. It is interesting to note that the conditional distribution of the losses 
exceeding any higher level L~  is also a Pareto distribution with parameters )1(jξ  and L~ . The 
results in this section are valid if thresholds are different for different risk cells, although 
later in the paper, for convenience, we assume the same threshold across risk cells.  
Define the Pareto tail parameter as )1()1()1( jjj a ϑξ = , where )1(ja  are known a priori 
constants (differences) and )1(jϑ  are the risk profiles of the cells in the bank. The constants 
)1(
ja  are scaling factors, reflecting differences in severities across the risks, that can be fixed 
by experts as discussed below. 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) of the tail parameter using data in a risk cell. 
Given that the losses )1(,kjX , 
)1(,...,1 jKk =  in the j-th risk cell of Bank 1 are conditionally 
(given )1(jϑ ) independent and Pareto distributed, the MLE of )1(jϑ  is 
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It is easy to show, see Rytgaard (1990), that an unbiased estimator of )1(jϑ  is 
 
)1(
)1(
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1ˆ
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j K
K ψϑ −= ,                                                         (6) 
with  
)2/()(]|ˆ[Var,]|ˆ[ )1(2)1()1()1()1()1()1( −== jjjjjjj KE ϑϑϑϑϑϑ .                        (7) 
 
A common situation in operational risk is that only a few losses are observed for certain 
risk cells. Thus, the standard MLE )1()1()1( ˆˆ jjj a ϑξ =  (based on the data in the j-th risk cell 
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only) for the Pareto parameters )1(jξ  will not be reliable (this is easy to see from the 
variance in (7)). The idea is to use the bank’s collective losses, industry data and expert 
opinions to improve the estimates of the Pareto parameters in the risk cells. 
 
Improved credibility estimator of the tail parameter using all data in the bank.  
The tail parameter estimator )1()1()1( ˆˆ jjj a ϑξ =  can be improved using all data in the bank as 
follows. Assume that, )1(jϑ  are independent identically distributed random variables with 
)1(
0
)1( ][ ϑϑ =jE  and 2)1(0)1( )(][Var τϑ =j , where )1(0ϑ  is a risk profile for the whole bank. 
Observe that, the unbiased estimators )1(ˆ jϑ , see (7), satisfy the assumptions of the 
Bühlmann-Straub model (2)-(3) and thus the credibility estimator is given by 
 
.
)/(1
2
where,)1(ˆˆˆ 2)1(
0
)1(
0
)1(
)1(
)1()1(
0
)1()1()1()1(
τϑαϑαϑαϑ +−
−=−+=
j
j
jjjjj K
K
           (8) 
 
The structural parameters )1(0ϑ  and 2)1(0 )(τ  can be estimated using data across all risk cells 
in the bank by solving two nonlinear equations (using e.g. iterative procedure, see 
Bühlmann and Gisler (2005), p.116-117): 
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where coefficients )1(jα  are given in (8), with )1(0ϑ  and 2)1(0 )(τ  replaced by )1(0ϑˆ  and 2)1(0 )ˆ(τ  
respectively. If the solution for 2)1(0 )ˆ(τ  is negative, then we set 0)1( =jα  and 
∑ == )1(1 )1()1()1()1(0 ˆ1ˆ Jj jjwW ϑϑ , where 2)1()1( −= jj Kw  and ∑ ==
)1(
1
)1()1( J
j jwW .  
The best credibility estimate for the tail parameter in the j-th cell (based on the cell 
data and all data in the bank) is )1()1()1( ˆˆˆˆ jjj a ϑξ = . We assumed that constants )1(ja  are known a 
priori. Note that these constants are defined up to a constant factor, i.e. coefficients )1(jα  
(and final estimates of tail parameters) will not change if all ,,...,1, )1()1( Jja j =  are 
changed/scaled by the same factor. Hence, only relative differences between risks play a 
role. These constants have the interpretation of a priori differences and can be fixed by 
expert using opinions on, for example, quantiles of losses exceeding )1(jL . For example, the 
expert may estimate the probability jq , that the loss in the j-th cell will exceed level jT , as 
jqˆ  and use relations )/ln(/ln
)1()1()1(
jjjjj LTqa −=ϑ  and )1(0)1( ][ ϑϑ =jE  to estimate )1(ja  as 
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)]/ln(/[ˆln )1()1(0 jjj LTq ϑ− . Only relative differences play a role so, here (without loss of 
generality) )1(0ϑ  can be set equal to 1. Experts may specify several quantiles, then )1(ja  can 
be estimated using, for example, a least square method. Ideally, the expert specifying 
constants )1(ja  has a complete overview over all risk cells in the bank, as only relative 
differences between risks are important. However, in practice, opinions from experts with 
special knowledge of business specifics within a risk cell are required. Combining opinions 
from different experts is one of the problems to be resolved by a practitioner. For a more 
detailed description on using expert opinions for quantification of frequency and severity 
distributions, see for example Alderweireld, Garcia and Léonard (2006), Shevchenko and 
Wüthrich (2006). 
 
Improved credibility estimator of the tail parameter using industry data.  
External data (above threshold )1(jL ) can be used to improve the estimate of the tail 
parameter )1()1()1( ˆˆˆˆ jjj a ϑξ = . This can be done using a hierarchical credibility model, 
Bühlmann and Gisler (2005), Chapter 6. Consider M banks with risk profiles )(0
mϑ , 
Mm ,...,1= . Assume that, )(0mϑ  are independent and identically distributed random 
variables with coll
mE ϑϑ =][ )(0  and 2)(0 ][Var collm τϑ = . Then the following statistics and 
credibility weights are calculated bottom up from the risk cells to industry level. 
• Calculate the risk profile estimators )(ˆ mjϑ  and credibility weights )(mjα  for all risk cells 
)(,...,1 mJj =  in the banks Mm ,...,1= : 
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• Calculate the risk profile estimators )(0ˆmϑ and credibility weights )(mβ  of the banks 
Mm ,...,1= : 
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• Calculate the risk profile estimator collϑˆ  for the industry 
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The final credibility estimators at bank level and in the risk cells are then calculated top-
down from the industry level to the individual risk cells: 
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Here, the estimator )1(ˆˆ jϑ  (for the tail parameter in the j-th risk cell) is improved, when 
compared with (8), through improved estimator of )1(0ϑ . Parameters )(0mϑ  and )(0mτ  can be 
estimated by solving two equations 
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where coefficients )(mjα  and )(mW  are given in (10)-(11) with )(0mϑ  and )(0mτ  replaced by 
their estimators )(0ˆ
mϑ  and )(0ˆ mτ  respectively. Finally, the parameter collτ  can be estimated as  
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Numerical example.  
To illustrate the above procedures consider an example where losses (exceeding $1million) 
observed in the Bank 1 with 10 risk cells are given in Table 1 and all risk cells are the same 
a priori, 10,...,1,1)1( == ja j . Using these losses the MLEs for the tail parameters )1(ˆ jϑ , 
presented in Table 1, are calculated by (6). Then, using (8) and (9), we estimate the bank 
structural parameters 116.1)ˆ( 2)1(0 ≈τ  and ,157.3ˆ )1(0 ≈ϑ  and credibility coefficients 
446.0)1( ≈jα  (the coefficients are the same because equal number of losses is observed in 
the cells). The credibility estimators ,ˆˆ )1(jϑ  shown in Table 1, are calculated using (8) 
disregarding industry data. Assume that, given losses across all banks, the industry 
parameters are estimated as 0.5ˆ =collϑ  and .9.0ˆ2 =collτ  Using (11), we calculate the 
estimator for the bank credibility coefficient .782.0ˆ )1( ≈β  Then formula (13) gives the 
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estimator for the bank structural parameter 558.3ˆˆ )1(0 ≈ϑ  improved by industry data. Finally, 
the credibility estimators )1(ˆˆ jϑ  utilizing industry data are calculated by (13) and presented in 
Table 1. In this example, the MLEs are quite volatile as the number of observations is small. 
For example: cell 7 has no large losses and thus its MLE is high; cell 10 has one large loss 
and thus its MLE is smaller, etc. One could easily calculate cell MLEs vs the number of 
observations in a cell and observe that MLEs are highly volatile for small number of 
observations. One large observation may lead to a substantial change in MLE. The 
credibility estimators (based on data in the bank) are smoother in compare to MLEs. This is 
because a credibility estimator is a weighted average, according to credibility theory, 
between a risk cell MLE and the estimator of the bank structural parameter )1(0ϑˆ  based on 
all data in the bank. The credibility weights )1(jα  are approximately 0.45 which means that 
a risk cell MLE (based on observations in a cell) )1(ˆ jϑ  and the a priori estimate 157.3ˆ )1(0 ≈ϑ  
are weighted with 0.45 and 0.55 respectively. Taking into account industry data increases 
the estimator of the bank structural parameter from 157.3ˆ )1(0 ≈ϑ  to 558.3ˆˆ )1(0 ≈ϑ  (because 
assumed industry collective estimator 0.5ˆ =collϑ  is larger than )1(0ϑˆ  and the credibility 
weight )1(β  for the bank is approximately 0.78). This leads to an increase in the credibility 
estimators across all cells when industry data are taken into account. 
 
 
Table 1: Losses (in millions $) exceeding $1million observed in the Bank 1 and corresponding 
maximum likelihood and credibility estimators for the Pareto tail parameter in the risk cells. 
cell 1 cell 2 cell 3 cell 4 cell 5 cell 6 cell 7 cell 8 cell 9 cell 10 
losses (in millions $) exceeding $1million observed in risk cells 
1.557 9.039 1.166 1.548 1.578 1.201 1.006 1.741 1.364 1.074 
1.079 2.138 1.037 1.040 1.282 2.815 1.169 1.165 2.036 1.103 
1.047 1.008 1.136 1.045 1.092 3.037 1.215 1.010 1.014 1.664 
1.199 1.761 2.104 1.774 1.658 1.001 1.116 1.096 1.217 1.049 
1.395 1.654 1.774 1.045 2.025 1.114 1.010 1.060 1.202 1.104 
1.060 1.073 1.161 1.856 1.129 1.422 1.560 1.352 1.095 2.924 
3.343 2.435 1.080 1.636 1.946 2.397 1.059 1.044 1.348 1.265 
2.297 4.357 1.154 1.403 1.831 1.241 1.059 1.678 1.191 1.333 
1.297 1.576 1.257 2.522 1.478 1.522 1.050 1.882 1.161 1.424 
1.180 1.113 1.231 1.113 1.208 1.243 1.231 1.401 1.017 1.435 
maximum likelihood estimators (MLEs) 10,...,1,ˆ )1( =jjϑ  
2.499 1.280 3.688 2.487 2.264 1.992 6.963 3.335 4.194 2.870 
credibility estimators 10,...,1,ˆˆ )1( =jjϑ  disregarding industry data 
2.863 2.319 3.394 2.858 2.759 2.637 4.855 3.236 3.620 3.029 
credibility estimators 10,...,1,ˆˆ )1( =jjϑ  utilizing industry data 
3.085 2.541 3.616 3.080 2.981 2.859 5.077 3.458 3.842 3.251 
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3 Modelling frequency 
Again, consider Bank 1, see Figure 1, and the upper index in all variables is used to refer 
the bank. Let )1(,kjN  be the annual number of loss events, exceeding threshold 
)1(
jL , in the j-
th risk cell ( )1(,...,1 Jj = ) in the k-th year. Hereafter, for convenience, we assume the same 
threshold L across all cells and all banks (e.g. one can choose the threshold equal to the 
threshold in the database of external data). If all data used for estimation are given on the 
level of risk cells then it is not difficult to modify the model allowing for cell specific 
thresholds. Assume that )1(,kjN  are Poisson distributed with the density function 
 
)exp(
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)|Pr( )1(
)1(
)1()1(
, j
n
j
jkj n
nN θθθ −×==                                        (16) 
and moments 
)1()1()1(
,
)1()1()1(
, ]|[Var,]|[ jjkjjjkj NNE θθθθ == .                                  (17) 
 
The arrival rate parameter is defined as )1()1()1( jjj λνθ = , where )1(jν  are the known a priori 
constants and )1(jλ  are the risk profiles of the bank cells. The constants )1(jν  are scaling 
factors, reflecting differences in frequencies across the risks, discussed below. 
 
Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) of the arrival rate using data in a risk cell.  
Assume that )1(,kjN , 
)1(,...,1 jKk =  in the j-th risk cell are conditionally independent (given 
)1(
jλ ). Then the standard MLE of )1(jλ  is 
 
∑
=
=
)1(
1
)1(
,)1(
)1(
~
1ˆ
jK
k
kj
j
j Nνλ , 
)1()1()1(~
jjj Kνν =                                           (18) 
with 
)1()1()1()1()1()1()1( ~/]|ˆ[Var,]|ˆ[ jjjjjjjE νλλλλλλ == .                            (19) 
 
Again, a common situation in operational risk is that only few large losses are observed for 
some risk cells, so the standard MLEs of parameters )1(jλ  will not be reliable. The idea is to 
use bank collective losses, industry data and expert opinions to improve the estimates of the 
arrival rate parameters for the risk cells in the bank. 
 
Credibility estimator of the arrival rate using all data in the bank.  
Assume that )1(jλ  are independent identically distributed with )1(0)1( ][ λλ =jE  and 
2)1(
0
)1( )(][Var ωλ =j . Observe that, the standardized frequencies )1()1(,)1(, / jkjkj NF ν=  satisfy  
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)1()1()1(
, ]|[ jjkjFE λλ =  and )1()1()1()1(, /]|[Var jjjkjF νλλ = .                            (20) 
 
Thus, )1(,kjF  satisfy the Bühlmann-Straub model (2)-(3) and the credibility estimator for 
)1(
jλ  
is given by 
 
,)1(ˆˆˆ )1(0
)1()1()1()1( λγλγλ jjjj −+=  where .)/(~
~
2)1(
0
)1(
0
)1(
)1(
)1(
ωλν
νγ += j
j
j               (21) 
 
The structural parameters )1(0λ  and )1(0ω  can be estimated using all data in the bank by 
solving two nonlinear equations (using e.g. iterative procedure, see Bühlmann and Gisler 
(2005), p.102-103): 
 
 ,ˆ~
1ˆ,0,
ˆ
max)ˆ( )1()1()1(0)1(
0
)1(
0
)1(
2)1(
0 ∑=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −×=
j
jj
JTc λγγλν
λω                     (22) 
where 
.
~
1
~
1
,ˆ1
,~,)ˆ(
~
1
,~
1)1(
1
)1(
0
)1(
)1(
0
)1(
)1(
)1()1(
1
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
1
2)1(
)1(
0
)1(
)1(
)1()1(
1
)1()1(
0
−
==
==
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−==
=−−==
∑∑
∑∑∑
J
j
jj
J
j
j
j
j
J
j
j
j
J
j
j
J
Jc
J
F
F
J
JT
ν
ν
ν
νλ
γγλν
ννν
 
 
Here, the coefficients )1(jγ  are given in (21) with )1(0λ  and )1(0ω  replaced by )1(0λˆ  and )1(0ωˆ  
respectively.  
The best credibility estimate for the arrival rate parameter in the j-th cell (based on 
the cell data and all data in the bank) is )1()1()1( ˆˆˆˆ jjj λνθ = . We assumed that the constants )1(jν  
are known a priori. Note that these constants are defined up to a constant factor, i.e. the 
coefficients )1(jγ  (and the final estimates of the arrival rate parameters) will not change if 
all )1(jν  are changed by the same factor. Hence, only relative differences between risks play 
a role. These constants have the interpretation of a priori differences and can be fixed by 
the expert opinions on expected annual number of losses exceeding threshold L for each 
risk cell. For example, the expert may estimate the expected annual number of events 
(exceeding threshold L ) jn  in the j-th cell as jnˆ  and use relations jjj n=)1()1( λν  and 
)1(
0
)1( ][ λλ =jE  to estimate )1(jν  as )1(0/ˆ λjn . Only relative differences play a role so, here 
(without loss of generality) )1(0λ  can be set equal to 1. For an example of using expert 
opinions for quantification of frequency and severity distributions, see Alderweireld, 
Garcia and Léonard (2006), Shevchenko and Wüthrich (2006). 
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Improved credibility estimator of the arrival rate using industry data.  
External data (above threshold L) can improve the estimate of arrival rate )1()1()1( jjj λνθ = . 
This can be done using a hierarchical credibility similar to that in the previous section. 
Below, we present formulas for completeness. Consider M banks with the risk profiles )(0
mλ , 
Mm ,...,1= . It is not difficult to introduce a priori differences between the banks but here, 
for convenience, we assume that, )(0
mλ  are independent and identically distributed random 
variables with coll
mE λλ =][ )(0  and 2)(0 ][Var collm ωλ = . Then the following statistics and 
credibility weights are calculated bottom up from the risk cells to the industry level. 
• Calculate the risk profile estimators )(ˆmjλ  and credibility weights )(mjγ  for all risk cells 
)(,...,1 mJj =  in the banks Mm ,...,1= : 
)()()(
2)(
0
)(
0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)(
,)(
)( ~,
)/(~
~
,~
1ˆ m
j
m
j
m
jmmm
j
m
jm
j
m
jK
k
m
kjm
j
m
j KN ννωλν
νγνλ =+== ∑= .          (23) 
• Calculate the risk profile estimators )(0ˆ mλ and credibility weights )(mρ  of the banks 
Mm ,...,1= : 
∑∑
==
=+==
)(
1
)()(
2)(
0
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
)()(
)(
)(
0 ,)/(
,ˆ1ˆ
mJ
j
m
j
m
coll
mm
m
m
mJ
j
m
j
m
jm
m W
W
W
W
γωωρλγλ .     (24) 
• Calculate the risk profile estimator collλˆ  of the industry 
.,ˆ1ˆ
1
)(
)(
1
)(
0
)( ∑∑
==
==
M
m
m
mJ
j
mm
coll AA
ρλρλ                                         (25) 
 
The final credibility estimators at bank level and in the risk cells are calculated top-down as 
 
.,...,1,ˆˆ)1(ˆˆˆ
,ˆ)1(ˆˆˆ
)()1(
0
)1()1()1()1(
)1()1(
0
)1()1(
0
m
jjjj
coll
Jj =−+=
−+=
λγλγλ
λρλρλ
                           (26) 
 
Here, the estimator )1(ˆˆjλ  is improved, when compared with (21), through improved 
estimator of )1(0λ . Parameters )(0mλ  and )(0mω  can be estimated by solving two nonlinear 
equations (using e.g. iterative procedure) for each bank Mm ,...,1= : 
 
,ˆ~
1ˆ,0,
ˆ
max)ˆ( )()()(0)(
0
)(
0
)(
2)(
0 ∑=⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ −×=
j
m
j
m
j
m
m
mm
m JTc λγγλν
λω                     (27) 
where 
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)(
)(
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1
)(
)(
)(
)(
1
2)(
)(
0
)(
)(
)()1(
1
)()(
0
−
==
==
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−==
=−−==
∑∑
∑∑∑
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j
m
m
j
m
m
j
m
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j
m
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j
m
j
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j
m
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m
j
m
mJ
j
m
j
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J
Jc
J
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F
J
JT
ν
ν
ν
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γγλν
ννν
 
 
Here, the coefficients )(mjγ  are given in (23) with )(0mλ  and )(0mω  replaced by )(0ˆ mλ  and 
)(
0ˆ
mω  respectively. Finally, the parameter collω  can be estimated as  
 
,0,
ˆ
)ˆˆ(
1
maxˆ
0
2
1
2)(
0
)(
0
0
)(
2
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−−×= ∑= W
M
W
W
M
Mc
M
m
mm
m
coll
τλλω                        (28) 
where 
1
1 0
)(
0
)(
1
)(
0
)(
0
1
)(
0
1
2)(
0
2
11
,ˆ1ˆ,,)ˆ(1ˆ
−
=
===
⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−=
===
∑
∑∑∑
M
m
mm
M
m
mm
M
m
m
M
m
m
W
W
W
W
M
Mc
M
WW
M
λλωτ
 
 
and coefficients )(mW  are given in (24). Note that the above equation is the same as (15) 
with substitution 22 collcoll ωτ → , )(0)(0 mm λϑ → , )(0)(0 mm ωτ → , )()( mm ρβ → . 
 
4 Remarks and Interpretation 
The credibility formulas (8) and (21), for the severity and frequency estimators, based on a 
cell and bank data, have a simple interpretation. As the number of observations in the j-th 
cell increases, the larger credibility weights )1(jα  and )1(jγ  are assigned to the estimators 
)1(ˆ
jϑ  and )1(ˆjλ  (based on the cell observations) and the lesser weights are assigned to the 
estimators )1(0ϑ  and )1(0λ  (based on all observations in the bank) respectively. Also, the 
larger )1(0τ  and )1(0ω  (variance across cells in the bank), the larger weights are assigned to 
)1(ˆ
jϑ  and )1(ˆjλ  correspondingly. 
The credibility formulas (10-13) and (23-26), taking into account industry data, 
have a simple interpretation too. As the number of observations in the bank increases, the 
larger credibiity weights )1(β  and )1(ρ  are assigned to the estimator )1(0ˆϑ  and )1(0λˆ  (based on 
the bank observations) and the lesser weight is assigned to the estimators collϑˆ and collλˆ  
(based on observations across all banks) respectively. Also, the larger collτ  and collω  
(variance across the banks), the larger weights are assigned to )1(0ˆϑ  and )1(0λˆ  
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correspondingly. For a detailed discussion on the credibility parameters, we refer to 
Bühlmann and Gisler (2005) Section 4.4. 
In a pure Bayesian approach, the industry risk profiles collϑ , collτ  and collλ , collω  
would be given a priori (often practice in the insurance industry). Then equations (9) and 
(22) should be solved for a bank only and estimators (for the tail parameter and arrival rate) 
in the bank risk cells are calculated using (13) and (26). It would be ideal if the industry 
risk profiles are calculated and provided by the regulators to ensure consistency across the 
banks. Also, if the banks would disclose their risk profile information then the industry 
profiles can be estimated using (11, 12) and (24, 25). Unfortunately this may not be 
realistic at the moment, then the industry risk profiles should be estimated by complete 
procedures as described in the above sections, using equations (10-12) and (23-25) for the 
severity and frequency estimators respectively. It will require knowledge of the large losses 
(above some large threshold) experienced by other banks available at the moment through 
external databases. For practical purposes, it is convenient to choose the same threshold L 
across all risk cells and all banks. One can choose the threshold equal to the threshold in 
the external database (e.g. L=$1Million). Then, vendors data (typically recorded above 
US$1Million) can be used for calibration of the proposed model. If available, consortium-
based data can be used for model calibration (it is expected that the threshold L in the 
proposed model is larger than the consortium-based data collection threshold). The data 
quality and survival biases in external databases are the issues that should be considered in 
practice but go beyond the purposes of this paper. 
 
5 The capital calculations 
For the purposes of the regulatory capital calculations of operational risk, the annual loss 
distribution, in particular its 0.999 quantile (VaR) as a risk measure, should be quantified 
for each Basel II risk cell in the matrix of eight business lines times seven risk types and for 
the whole bank. The credibility model presented in this paper is proposed for modeling low 
frequency high impact losses exceeding some large threshold L. Of course, modelling of 
the high frequency low impact losses (below threshold L) should be added to the model 
before the final operational risk capital charge is estimated (for a related actuarial literature 
on this topic see Sandström (2006) and Wüthrich (2006)). That is, we suggest that the 
losses above threshold L are modelled using credibility theory as described in this paper, 
while the losses below the threshold are modelled separately. Note that typically, the low 
frequency high impact losses give largest contribution to the final capital charge. The 
number of high frequency low impact losses recorded in the bank internally is usually large 
enough to obtain reliable estimates by a standard fitting of the frequency and severity 
distributions without the use of the external data. Modelling these losses is important but 
goes beyond the purposes of this paper. 
The total LDA model for an annual loss jZ  in risk cell j (combining losses below 
and above L) is 
 
∑∑
==
+=
)(
1
)(
,
)(
1
)(
,
hf
jN
k
hf
kj
lf
jN
n
lf
njj XXZ .                                              (29) 
 16
 
Here, )(lfjN  and 
)(
,
lf
njX , 
)(,...,1 lfjNn =  are the annual number of events and iid severities of 
the low frequency high impact losses (exceeding L) modelled by distributions (.))(lfjP  and 
(.))(lfjF  respectively. 
)(hf
jN  and 
)(
,
hf
kjX , 
)(,...,1 hfjNk =  are the annual number events and 
iid severities of the high frequency low impact losses (below L) modelled by distributions 
(.))(hfjP  and (.)
)(hf
jF  respectively. It is reasonable to assume that the low frequency high 
impact losses and high frequency low impact losses are independent, i.e: njX ,  and kjY ,  are 
independent, )(lfjN  and 
)(hf
jN  are independent. As usual, independence between severities 
and frequencies is assumed. In the credibility model described in this paper, (.))(lfjP  and 
(.))(lfjF  are the Poisson and Pareto distributions with parameters jθ  and jξ  estimated by 
)1()1( ˆˆ
jj λν  and )1()1( ˆˆ jja ϑ  respectively as described in the above sections. Then, the annual loss 
distribution for each risk cell and the whole bank can be calculated using, for example, the 
Monte Carlo procedure with the following logical steps (where all random samples are 
independent): 
Step1. For each risk cell Jj ,...,1=  simulate the annual number of events )(lfjN  and )(hfjN  
from the distributions (.))(lfjP  and (.)
)(hf
jP  respectively. 
Step2. Given )(lfjN  and 
)(hf
jN  from the Step 1, simulate severities 
)(
,
lf
njX , 
)(,...,1 lfjNn =  and 
)(
,
hf
kjX , 
)(,...,1 hfjNk =  from distributions (.))(lfjF  and (.))(hfjF  respectively. 
Step3. Find the annual loss jZ  for each risk cell Jj ,...,1=  using formula (29) and the 
annual loss in the bank as ∑
=
=
J
k
jZZ
1
. 
Step4. Repeat Steps 1-3 K times to build samples of the annual losses )(kZ  and )(kZ j , 
Kk ,...,1= . Then, the 0.999 quantile (and other distribution characteristics if required) is 
estimated using simulated sample in a usual way. 
 
In the above procedure we assumed that risk cells are independent. While it is important 
(and quite realistic) assumption of the proposed model that the low frequency high impact 
losses from different risk cells are independent, dependence can be considered between the 
high frequency low impact losses from different risk cells. The dependence can be 
introduced using for example copula methods. For further information on the application of 
the copula method in finance, we refer to McNeil, Frey and Embrechts (2005). Also, see 
Frachot, Roncalli and Salomon (2004) for a discussion of dependence between operational 
risks. The modelling of common events (shocks) that affect many risk cells simultaneously 
is another important part of operational risk modelling. These common shocks can be 
modelled as separate compound processes and mapped to the risk cells, effectively 
introducing dependence between risk cells, see Lindskog and McNeil (2003). Accurate 
quantification of the dependencies between the risks is a difficult task, which is an open 
field for future research. 
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The qualitative impact of considering industry data on the bank VaR figures is quite 
intuitive for the proposed credibility model. If the industry risk profile collλ  is higher than 
the bank profile )1(0λ  based on the internal data, then the credibility estimators of the bank 
profile and arrival rate in risk cells will increase, as follows from (26), and vice versa. 
Increase in the arrival rate estimators in all risk cells of the bank will increase VaR figures 
for the bank and vice versa. Also, if the industry risk profile collϑ  is larger than the bank 
profile )1(0ϑ  based on the internal data, then the credibility estimators for the bank profile 
and Pareto tail parameter in risk cells will increase, as follows from (13), and vice versa 
(this behaviour of the credibility estimators is demonstrated in the numerical example, 
Table 1). Increase of the Pareto tail parameter across all risk cells will decrease VaR 
figures for the bank and vice versa. The magnitudes of these impacts will depend on 
credibility weights of the bank )1(β  and )1(ρ  discussed in the previous section. 
 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed the use of a full credibility theory approach to estimate 
parameters of the frequency (Poisson) and severity (Pareto) distributions for the low 
frequency high impact operational risk losses exceeding some threshold for each risk cell. 
The initial estimators are based on the use of risk cell data. Then the estimators are 
improved by the use of all data in the bank (across all risk cells) and by experts who may 
specify the relative difference between risks. Finally, the estimators are corrected by the 
industry data. A numerical example of the procedure for the loss severities is given in 
Table 1 (the procedure for the loss frequencies is very similar). The main reason for the 
proposed approach is that, typically, the bank’s internal data of the large losses in risk cells 
are so limited that the standard maximum likelihood estimates are not reliable. The 
proposed credibility theory approach allows to use the bank’s collective losses, external 
data and expert opinions to improve the estimates. 
The described model is not too complicated but it gives an example of a full 
credibility approach that we believe is well suited for operational risk quantification. It has 
a simple structure which is beneficial for practical use and can engage the bank risk 
managers, statisticians and regulators in productive model development and risk 
assessment. The model provides a framework that can be developed further by considering 
other distribution types and dependencies between risks. As it stands, the model does not 
have a time component and incorporation of evolutionary models, where the risk profiles 
are evolving in time, is important for further development. Justification of the model 
assumptions (such as conditional independence between the losses or common distribution 
for the risk profiles across the risks) can be based on the analysis of the unconditional 
properties (e.g. unconditional means, covariances) of the losses and should be addressed 
during model implementation. Adding extra levels to the considered hierarchical structure 
may be required to model the actual risk cell structure in a bank. 
Of course, a full Bayesian approach would allow for quantification not only better 
point estimates for the distribution parameters but their whole posterior distributions, see 
e.g. Shevchenko and Wüthrich (2006). However, it requires specification of the prior 
distributions that can often be difficult in the case of very limited data. We hope that 
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practitioners in operational risk will find the presented model useful both from a practical 
and an educational point of view. 
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